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THE POWER PARADOX: THE
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
VIRGINIA MINORITY
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION CASES
INTRODUCTION

Without advanced planning, minority shareholders in a closely
held corporation can find themselves in the unenviable position of
being up a creek without a paddle. Minority shareholders often
invest in a corporation
the belief that the investment will
provide them with a steady stream of income, either from a job or
from payment of dividends. 1 Yet many fail to protect themselves
with employment contracts or buy-sell agreements, 2 leaving them
vulnerable to a majority shareholder who may decide to fire them
or withhold dividends. 3 Without a source of income, a minority
shareholder can face an indefinite period when there is no return
on his or her investment. 4
To address this problem, many states, including Virginia, have
enacted some form of the Model Business Corporation Act (the
5
"MBCA"). The MBCA allows for involuntary dissolution of a cor1. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
Bus. LAW. 699, 702 (1993).
2. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or At Least Understand VVhy You
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 495-96 (2009).
3. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703.
4. Id.
5. Harry Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as A Remedy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 33 n.31 (1987). In order to
adopt the MBCA, most states name their respective statute according to the model language of section 1.01 of the MBCA which states: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the '[name of state] Business Corporation Act." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007);
see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (noting that Virginia chose the language "Virginia Stock Corporation Act"). Specific provisions within Vir-
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poration in certain circumstances. 6 Dissolution, however, is considered a drastic remedy as it requires the corporation to enter
into receivership and eventually be sold off.7 Because of this,
courts are often hesitant to order dissolution except in cases of
continued and egregious oppression. To address this problem,
courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have allowed equitable remedies, such as buy-outs or the appointment of a provisional director, in cases of minority shareholder oppression. 8
Although courts in other states have interpreted the MBCA's
oppression provision as allowing equitable remedies, 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled that Virginia's oppression
statutory scheme provides only for the exclusive remedy of dissolution.10 Accordingly, it is up to the General Assembly to add equi-

ginia's corporation legislation likewise appear identical or very similar. Compare MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30(a)(2)(ii) (2007) (the MBCA's oppression subsection within its overall dissolution provision), with VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.l-747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum.
Supp. 2013) (Virginia's oppression subsection within its overall dissolution provision).
6. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30 (2007). Those circumstances include:
[(1) where] the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable
injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
shareholders generally, because of the deadlock; [(2)] the directors or those in
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that
is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; [(3)] the shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired.
Id.
7. See, e.g., Colgate v. Disthene Group, Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 317 (2012) (Buckingham
County); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Drastic Times Call for
Drastic Measures: A Fairfax County Judge Orders Judicial Dissolution in the Face of Minority Shareholder Oppression, RICH. B. ASS'N (Sept. 2012), http://www.richmondbar.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/business_law_tip_September_2012.pdf [hereinafter Drastic Times].
8. See, e.g., Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Scott, 64
P.3d at 10; cf. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
9. See Scott, 64 P.3d at 9; Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 357 n.3 (providing a detailed discussion
of certain equitable remedies used in various jurisdictions).
10. Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (1990); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972). The Supreme Court of Washington has
interpreted the same statutory language, "a court ... may dissolve a corporation," as allowing for equitable remedies up to and including dissolution. The Supreme Court of Virginia, on the other hand, has found the exact same language to only allow dissolution of a
corporation and nothing more. Compare Scott, 64 P.3d at 9 (finding that alternative remedies are available in addition to dissolution), with Giannoti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at
733 ("The remedy specified by the legislative while discretionary, is 'exclusive,' and does
not permit the trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies.").
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come for the General Assembly to take this step and ensure that
trial courts have
authority necessary to address instances of
alleged oppression.

the MBCA's
9
nedies, the Sunia's oppression
remedy of dissonbly to add equi-

Additional remedies are necessary to allow Virginia trial courts
to respond to the unique circumstances presented in each case.
Without additional remedies, trial courts are left with the choice
of dissolution or dismissal, a stark contrast that ignores the
murkiness of oppression in some cases. 11 To remedy this problem,
this comment includes proposed draft legislation modeled after
Oregon's dissolution statute. This new statute will provide Virginia courts with the flexibility needed to respond to the facts and
circumstances presented in each unique oppression case.
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The proposed statute would add equitable remedies to Virginia's dissolution statute, allowing courts to order a wide range of
non-exhaustive remedies including an accounting, damages, or
the appointment of an individual as a provisional director. The
proposed statute makes dissolution a last resort option that a
court only considers after other remedies are deemed insufficient.
Further, the statute allows forward-looking shareholders to optout of most of the equitable remedies, excepting dissolution, damages, and an accounting, through agreement. Thus, the proposed
statute addresses the problems inherent in a dissolution-only regime while providing shareholders with the opportunity to structure deals
avoid the effects of the statute.

~ted
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The proposed statute will help give teeth to a law that Virginia
courts are currently hesitant to apply. 12 Although Virginia's oppression statute provides some protection to minority shareholders, it is not generally seen as particularly protective. 13 Instead,
Virginia
calls for significant deference to a corporation's
management under the business judgment rule, which creates a
11. The Virginia statute does provide one other option, a pre-trial buy-out; however,
only the defendant or the corporation may elect to buy-out the plaintiff and end the case.
See VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
12. See, e.g., Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 304.
13. Drastic Times, supra note 7. It should be noted that Virginia Code section§ 13.174 7 is written such that oppression is addressed as a subsection within the overall dissolution statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-74 7 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). Despite this
construction, the oppression provision has become the thrust of the statute. For this reason, this article uses the term "oppression statute" when technically referencing the dissolution statute generally, of which oppression is addressed in a subsection.
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presumption that a director of a corporation has discharged
duties "in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the
best interests of the corporation." 14 While many states apply an
objective standard to a director's decisions in running a corporation, Virginia applies a subjective view of the director's good faith
business judgment. 15
Despite this highly deferential atmosphere, the recent Virginia
case of Colgate v. Disthene Group shows that Virginia courts
not defer to a corporation's directors in any and all circumstances.16 Colgate involved a decades-long
over
management of a kyanite mine and other operations,
lectively were worth millions. 17 The · court
ness judgment rule was inapplicable as it required
"actually exercise their good
business judgment." 18
court found there was "no reason to believe that
management
of Disthene will ever treat the Plaintiffs fairly," dissolution was
the appropriate remedy. 19
This comment addresses where Virginia's current scheme falls
short and why equitable remedies are needed in Virginia
ty shareholder oppression cases. Part I looks at how
attempted to solve the problem of minority shareholder oppression. Part II explores how other jurisdictions have interpreted or
added to the MBCA so as to provide additional remedies
nority shareholder oppression cases. Finally, Part
advocates
for adoption of a new dissolution statute in Virginia that includes
equitable remedies for such cases.
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15. Compare In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.2d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (explaining Delaware's business judgment rule is an objective standard: "Under [Delaware's
business judgment rule) the court is precluded from inquiring into the substantive fairness
of [a director's decision] ... unless [that decision was] so disparate that no rational person
acting in good faith could have thought the [decision] was fair to the minority.") (emphasis
added), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013) (stating that
courts consider whether a director fulfilled his duties in "accordance with his good faith
business judgment") (emphasis added).
16. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 317.
17. Id. at 287-88; see also Bill McKelway, Jurists Rejects Appeal of Firm's Dissolution;
Va. High Court Refuses Kyanite Company's Bid to Overturn Liquidation, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2013, at BOl ("In all, Disthene holdings are believed to be valued at
some $200 million.").
18. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 317.
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I.
environment is particularly prone to
20
abuse
shareholders who fail to protect themselves.
These corporations are often started by friends or family mem21
bers with little or no business experience. Furthermore, the initial shareholders often decide against consulting an attorney,
finding it an unnecessary expense. 22
determining that minority
shareholders should be protected from abuse, many states, in24
The MBCA offers
Virginia,23 have enacted the
some protection to
shareholders who might otherwise be
stuck
position of possessing stock without the
25
Virginia's General Assembly has also
enacting a pre-trial buy-out remedy,
defendants or the corporation to buy-out the
26
interest
the corporation prior to trial.
describes the problems unique to closely held corpocurrent statutory scheme fails to ade-

Corporations
Minority
invest in corporations with their
family or
possess a useful skillset and plan to
work
the
Thus, many shareholders invest with
the belief that
investment will lead to steady income, either
or
dividends. 29 Minority shareholders often fail,
to protect themselves before buying into a corporation

20. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 702.
21. Id.; Molitor, supra note 2, at 491.
22. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491-93.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-60 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.l747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0101 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-01 (2013); see also
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007) (outlining the model provision language with which
specific states may adopt the MBCA).
25. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.30 (2007).
26. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.l (Cum. Supp. 2013).
27. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491.
28. Thompson, supra note 1, at 702.
29. Id.

,,'
1;,

I'
I
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by not utilizing employment contracts or
Without any protection, minority
to the decisions of the majority shareholder,
terminate the minority shareholder or reduce dividend payments. 31 This lack of control can
leave
shareholder facing an indefinite
earning any income back
shareholders, through no
position when they
As an example of how a
to engage
corporation and
sary to protect himself, consider

a

Individuals A, B, and C, all
poration to make widgets. All three have an
corporation, each owning 33%
the stock.
ployed in various positions of the
to draft an employment
buy-sell arrangement or any
together.
three
employees is protected.
widgets, with all three partners
and dividend payouts, personality
that align A and B against C.
the directors, A and B decide to fire C
cut dividend payments
while increasing their own salaries. This leaves C with no protection, having been "frozen out" 33 of a business that
helped ere-

30. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 912
(2005) ("Because close corporation owners are frequently linked by family or other personal relationships, there is often an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the
sense that contractual protection is needed."); see also, Molitor, supra note 2, at 493, 496
(referring more generally to ways in which minority shareholders fail to protect themselves at the outset). Buy-sell agreements can be drafted numerous ways, but may include
provisions addressing who can buy the stock, what price the stock will be sold for, and
what events might trigger a buyout. See Robert W. Wood, In Business? Get a Buy-Sell
Agreement!, FORBES.COM (Feb. 7, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood
12011/02/07/in-business-get-a-buy-sell-agreement/.
31. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703.
32. Id.
33. The term "frozen out" essentially means being cut off from the business both in
terms of decision making and profiting therefrom. It is commonly used to signal oppression in the closely held corporation context. See infra note 35.
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ate. With a minority interest, as long as A and B stay aligned in
their decision-making, C has no way to force any change in the
corporation and is left in the unenviable position of
a
nancial interest with no return on his investment. To make matters worse, C has lost his primary source of income-employment
at ABC Corporation. Finally, since this is a closely held corporation, with no shares listed on a public stock exchange, C has no
market in which to sell his interest. Looking
were C to
bring a successful claim for oppression, the
remedy
available to the court is dissolution of
corporation-a forced
sale of the business. Of course, A and B could step
the
corporation back, which would essentially amount to a
C's interest, but only if A and B have enough
assets to purchase the corporation or secure a loan for the purchase. both A
and B's money is tied up in ABC Corporation, as is often the case,
then A and B might not be able to come up with the funds, and
the business could be purchased by someone else.
hypothetical above, minority shareholders
As is clear from
invest in a corporation with high hopes
big dreams.
shareholders often do not stop to consider
relationships sour and, instead, rely on the idea that their personal relationships with the other investors will survive, and
34
hopefully even thrive, in the business world.
many cases,
however, the pressure of making business decisions can cause
rifts in those relationships that eventually lead to the "freezing
out" 35 of one, or possibly more, of the minority shareholders.
If C, in the above hypothetical, considered suing for dissolution,
he would have to lay out exactly how A and B acted oppressively.
Although central to determining whether or not dissolution is appropriate, the MBCA and many state statutes fail to define oppression. Instead, state courts have stepped in to provide a definition. The Supreme Court of Virgini:;i. opined in VVhite v. Perkins
that oppression is "a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder

34. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912.
35. Id. at 889-90. "Standard freeze-out techniques include the refusal to declare dividends, the termination of a minority shareholder's employment, the removal of a minority
shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of corporate earnings
through high compensation to the majority shareholder, quite often, these tactics are used
in combination." Id.
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who entrusts
money to a company is entitled to rely." 36 The
Supreme Court of
Carolina has listed several relevant factors in finding a violation of fair dealing or fair play, including:
"exclusion from management, withholding of dividends, paying
excessive salaries to majority shareholders, and analogous activities."37 Other factors courts have considered include abusive conduct, recurring breaches of fiduciary duty, or frustration of a
shareholder's reasonable expectations." 38
B. Virginia's

of

MBCA's Oppression Provision

Virginia
the MBCA in 1956. 39 Under the MBCA, a
court may order a corporation dissolved
certain specific, exclu40
sive circumstances. One of those circumstances is when the directors, or those in control, have "acted, are acting, or will act in a
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent." 41 The law is
specific about remedies available to the court, stating that a trial
court may dissolve a corporation if the plaintiff establishes that
one of the circumstances has been met. 42 The statute does not expressly allow for any other remedy, and Virginia courts have interpreted Virginia's version of the MBCA as providing for only
one remedy, dissolution,
an oppression case. 43

36. 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972) (citations omitted).
37. See Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 n.25 (S.C.
2001); see also Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 386-87 (2004) (noting that most state statutes allowing for dissolution due
to oppression fail to define oppression, leaving the courts to supply a definition).
38. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 387.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1950) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747
(Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
40. Id.§ 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
41. Id. § 13.l-747(A)(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). The other two circumstances are where:
[t]he directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the
corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the
corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders
generally, because of the deadlock; or (2) [t]he shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired.
Id.§§ 13.l-747(A)(l)(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
42. Id.§ 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
43. See, e.g., White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia first considered the issue of
whether the MBCA provided for equitable remedies
v.
Perkins. 44 In White, the plaintiff and the defendant
a cor45
poration with the defendant as the controlling shareholder. The
corporation, at the insistence of the defendant, never declared nor
paid dividends. 46 Because the plaintiff was required to pay income
taxes on money that he was not receiving, he became "financially
pressed." 47 Despite his awareness of the plaintiff's financial situation, the defendant still refused to declare or pay dividends or, alternatively, agree to a buy-out of either his stock or the plaintiff's
stock. 48
The trial court found that the defendant majority shareholder
oppressed the plaintiff minority shareholder and ordered
cor49
poration to declare and pay dividends, as well as other remedies.
On appeal, the supreme court held that, while the trial court
could have ordered the dissolution of the corporation, the court
50
could not, under the statute, order any alternative remedies. In
determining that dissolution was the only statutorily available
option, the court stated that Virginia's oppression provision
"clearly shows an intent by the General Assembly that the alter51
natives provided there are exclusive rather than inclusive."
Thus, the court in an oppression case is faced with the choice of
52
either dissolving the corporation or dismissing the case.

).

257, 266 n.25 (S.C.
Law, 29 DEL. J.
for dissolution due
finition).

~te

)E ANN. § 13.1-747

The other two cir-

;e affairs, the
injury to the
affairs of the
shareholders
leadlocked in
two consecul terms have

0 (1972).

44. Id.
45. Id. at 131, 189 S.E.2d at 317.
46. Id., 189 S.E.2d at 318.
47. Id. at 131-32, 189 S.E.2d at 318.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 130, 189 S.E.2d at 317.
50. Id. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. It should be noted that in VVhite, the court did state
that it clearly could have appointed a custodian with power to continue the business. Id.
It is likely that the VVhite court was alluding to the remedy currently codified at Virginia
Code section 13.l-748(A) which permits a court to appoint a custodian to manage the corporation "while the proceeding is pending." VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-748(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011)
(emphasis added). This, however, is a temporary appointment only. Thus when reading
the appointment language in VVhite, one should place his or her emphasis on the exclusivity of dissolution. It is VVhite's holding that the alternatives to dissolution are exclusive, not
inclusive. VVhite, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. Several subsequent Virginia decisions,
holding that dissolution is the only alternative available to a court in Virginia, support
this interpretation. See infra note 56.
51. VVhite, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320.
52. See id. Again, while the VVhite court seemed to indicate that there might be another available alternative (i.e., appointing a custodian to continue the business), this Ian-
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In finding that dissolution was the only available remedy, the
Supreme Court of Virginia did not elaborate as to why it reached
this conclusion, except for implying that the conclusion was obvious from the statutory language. 53 Along with this textual analysis, the court may have based its opinion on other considerations,
including the knowledge that minority shareholders are oftentimes able to pursue other causes of actions that provide alternative remedies, 64 and the idea that courts should promote the use
of contracts to protect minority shareholders before a business
deal is finalized, as opposed to courts providing the sole protection. 56 Subsequent Virginia opinions have followed the lVhite
court in finding that dissolution is the only remedy available to a
trial court in oppression cases. 66 In Giannotti v. Hamway,
court held that "[t]he remedy specified by the legislature [dissolution], while discretionary, is 'exclusive' and does not permit the
trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies." 67 In
short, lVhite and other courts have narrowly construed the remedies available for cases of shareholder oppression. Under the current scheme, dissolution is wholly favored over the recognition of
other equitable remedies.

C. Virginia's Pre-Trial Buyout Option
Following several decades where the only option in oppression
cases was dissolution, the General Assembly enacted a statute
that allows for a pre-trial buyout. Under Virginia Code section
guage would appear to contradict the overall holding in White and how subsequent Virginia courts have interpreted it and it should be viewed as dicta. See supra note 50. To the
extent that such a remedy is indeed available, it is only a temporary solution. Virginia
courts have not appointed a custodian as a permanent remedy in oppression cases.
53. White, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320.
54. For example, a minority shareholder could bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
55. In most cases, minority shareholders can protect themselves by entering into employment agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to investing in a corporation. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with
consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a courtimposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.
Id. However, minority shareholders who inherit their shares do not have this opportunity.
56. See, e.g., Stickley v. Stickley, 43 Va. Cir. 123, 144-46 (1997) (Rockingham County);
Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28-29, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733-34 (1990); Jordon v. Bowman Apple Prod. Co., 728 F. Supp. 409, 415 (W.D. Va. 1990).
57. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
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13.
1, a corporation or a shareholder in the corporation, can
58
elect to buy the shares of the complaining shareholder. An
tion, however, must be made within ninety days of the
suit for dissolution, or "at such later time as the court
cretion may allow." 59 The election must be done
to
once the election is made, a fair value of the shares will be
uu.uvu. either by agreement among the parties or, if they are una60
to agree, by the court. An election is
determines that it is equitable to set aside or
election." 61 After the fair value of the shares is
court must enter an order directing the purchase of
may also award the petitioning shareholder
torney fees
expert fees if the court determines
62
tioner's claims under section 13.1-747 were meritorious.
ther, once a buy-out order is entered, the court must dismiss
petition to dissolve, and the petitioning shareholder
ha[s] any rights or status as a shareholder of the corporation, except the right to receive the amounts awarded to
by
63
of the court."
The buy-out alternative was enacted to provide a "less
remedy" in cases of shareholder conflict, while at the same
time ensuring that no shareholder had a tactical advantage over
the other shareholders. 64 With the possibility of a
buyout, a shareholder interested
pursuing dissolution now must
consider the potential exposure that he risks to a pre-trial buyout.65 As one trial court observed, "[i]t is perhaps an
result of the statute that a plaintiff who originally sought to dissolve a corporation ends up in a proceeding to establish value
provides for no formal discovery." 66 Thus, pursuing dissolution
might lead to a forced sale in a proceeding where the plaintiff

58. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
59. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
60. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
61. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
62. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(E) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
63. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(F) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
64. Allen C. Goolsby & Louanna 0. Heuhsen, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Corporate and Business Law, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 165, 194 (2005).
65. See id.
66. Hartley v. Marco Invs., Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 294, 295 (2011) (Norfolk City).
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does not have formal access to discovery
may be left w1tn an
agreement that contains unfavorable terms. 67
D. Colgate v. Disthene Group
Since the enactment of the pre-trial buyout, Virginia has only
seen two cases involving minority shareholder oppression go to
68
trial. The most recent case, Colgate v. Disthene Group, involved
two sides of a family fighting over the management of a prosperous business in Buckingham County. 69 As one local news reporter
summarized, this case "redefined Virginia business law, [and] exposed the withering business practices of a generations-old
mining and landholding concern." 70
The Colgate case focused on the complicated and dramatic relationships between the descendants of Guy Dixon, who first
bought a kyanite
at a bankruptcy sale in 1945. 71 After Dixon's death, one side of the family inherited a majority of the
shares, including all of the voting stock, 72 while the other side
herited a minority share
all non-voting stock. 73 Following several years of low dividend payments and evidence of "exorbitant"
salaries, the minority shareholders filed suit against the majority
74
shareholders. The minority shareholders asserted, among other
allegations, that they were being oppressed, accusing the majority shareholders of authorizing large bonuses while cutting
75
dends. The minority shareholders sought dissolution
the
thene Group. 76

67. Id.; Goolsby & Heuhsen, supra note 64, at 194.
68. The first case, Cattano v. Bragg, centered on whether a minority shareholder
could simultaneously bring a derivative suit and an individual action for judicial dissolution. 283 Va. 638, 643, 727 S.E.2d 625, 626 (2012).
69. 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287-89 (2012) (Buckingham County).
70. Bill McKelway, Chase City Man Finally Prevails in Kyanite Case, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/
chase-city-man-finally-prevails-in-kyanite-case/article_1129d777-ad2f-5ec3-acde-flbfd742
f5dc.html [hereinafter McKelway, Chase City Man].
71. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287.
72. Id. at 288.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 289.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The trial court found that several of the actions taken by the
majority shareholders were oppressive and "visibly depart[ed]
from the standards of fair dealing." 77 The court first determined
that the majority shareholders purposely withheld dividend payments as retaliation for previous trust litigation pursued by the
minority shareholders. 78 The court further found that the majority
shareholders awarded themselves "enormous pay raises and even
79
larger bonuses" during the same period of time. In its conclu"been
sion, the court stated that the minority shareholders
treated as irksome interlopers, problems to be dealt
preferably by squeezing them out at a below market price, or slashing
dividends in the hope of depriving them of
financial
to seek legal recourse." 80 The trial court then held
dissolution was appropriate and ordered the Disthene Group
dissolved. 81
Following the trial court's order of dissolution, this case was
considered a potential "turning
in Virginia's judicial ap82
proach to the rights and protections of minority shareholders."
The
expert witness opined that the holding would "help
bolster minority shareholder investment in Virginia companies
because of the protections the decision carries for minority shareholders."83 The parties ultimately settled, wherein the defendants
84
agreed to buy out the plaintiffs for $70 million, after an appeal
to
Supreme Court of Virginia was eventually granted. 85
Virginia case involving possible oppression is currently working its way through the courts. The case involves the beloved Virginia landmark, Luray Caverns, owned by the Graves

77. Id. at 295, 298.
78. Id. at 296.
79. Id. at 297.
80. Id.at316-17.
81. Id. at 317.
82. Drastic Times, supra note 7.
83. Id.
84. Bill McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Finally Comes to a Close, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, June 11, 2013, at Bl.
85. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied the first appeal request. The defendants
then petitioned for a rehearing, which was granted by the supreme court. See Bill
McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(June 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/kyanite-mining-case-go
ing-to-virginia-supreme-court/article_d5e573ca-alal-51f6-80cl-fe573536ce28.html [hereinafter McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court].
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86

family and worth approximately $20 million. Prior to the death
of their parents, there were several internal disputes among the
six siblings over who should run the caverns and who should be
trustee for the family's multiple trusts. 87 The fighting exploded into multiple lawsuits over the last several decades, with accusations against one sibling for creating "golden parachutes" for herself and two of her brothers, and against that same sibling for
acting "imperial" when she managed the caverns and freezing out
another brother from all decision-making.ss
Although the Luray case is still pending, the Colgate decision
has important implications for how the case may turn out. With
what appears to be a similar fact pattern, including one side of
the family controlling the business and providing themselves with
excessive monetary benefit, it is quite possible that any trial alleging oppression could result in dissolution. 89 Even without the
Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately deciding the Colgate case,
the combination of the trial court's decision 90 and the high settlement in Colgate may provide the Luray defendants with additional incentive to settle any case alleging oppression to avoid
risking dissolution.
Virginia's statutory scheme currently offers only limited remedies in minority shareholder oppression cases. A plaintiff can attempt to negotiate an informal resolution with the majority
shareholders or sue for dissolution. 91 After suit has been filed, the
corporation or other shareholders have the option to buy-out the
92
Once the case gets to trial, however, the only remedy

86. Ken Otterbourg, The Rift-A Family Dynasty Fights Over the Future of Luray
Caverns, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2013, at A-101.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Professor Carl Tobias, a law professor at the University of Richmond School of
Law, who closely followed the case opined that the circuit court's "careful opinion will
withstand scrutiny [by the supreme court] because [the judge's] ruling on the law was correct and [the judge] is closest to the underlying facts, having heard weeks of testimony at
the trial level." McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85.
91. Cf. James Irving, Minority Shareholder Rights in Virginia, BEAN KINNEY &
KORMAN PC (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.beankinney.com/publications-articles-minorityshareholder-rights-virginia.html (noting that the business judgment rule is a potential
defense for defendants in dissolution suits but only if they have not wholly refused to participate in the informal negotiation process).
92. See source cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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available to the judge is dissolution. 93 Recognizing the limitations
inherent in the MBCA's oppression provision, other jurisdictions
have expanded the remedies available to courts in oppression
94
cases.

II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS

A majority of states have enacted the MBCA, which provides
for an oppression cause of action. 95 Delaware, however, has decided against allowing oppression causes of action, instead finding
that minority shareholders in such circumstances are protected
by fiduciary duty requirements. Of those states that allow oppression cases, many have allowed additional remedies besides
dissolution. Courts in some states, such as Washington and Missouri, have interpreted the oppression provision in the MBCA as
granting a wide range of remedies. 96 Legislatures in other states,
such as Illinois, have explicitly added alternative remedies to
their statutes. 97 Virginia should follow the lead of other MBCA
states that allow equitable remedies in oppression cases.

A Requiring Minority Shareholders to Protect Themselves on the
Front End
98

Delaware, the "pre-eminent jurisdiction in corporate law," has
not adopted the MBCA. Instead, Delaware case law provides for a
cause of action based on breach of fiduciary duties owed to minority shareholders by majority shareholders but does not recognize

e Future of Luray

ichmond School of
ireful opinion will
m the law was cor~ks of testimony at
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BEAN KINNEY &
;-articles-minority·ule is a potential
>lly refused to par-

93. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); see also supra
notes 50-57 (noting the exclusively of dissolution as remedy for oppression).
94. See infra Part II.
95. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 1.01, 14.30 (2007); Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 33
n.31; see also supra note 5 (for more discussion on the adoption of the MBCA and its oppression provision).
96. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
97. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.50(b) (2013) ("As an alternative to dissolution, the court
may order any of the other remedies contained in subsection (b) of Section 12.55") (referring to the remedies of appointing a custodian to manage the business or the appointing of
a provisional director to serve for a particular term under court-prescribed terms).
98. Siegel, supra note 37, at 378.
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an oppression cause of action. Although an oppression claim was
once heard by a Delaware Chancery Court judge in Litle v. Waters,99 the Supreme Court of Delaware quickly overruled this opinion and elucidated that minority shareholders of closely held corporations in Delaware could not bring a case alleging
.
100
oppression.

Litle was the first Delaware case to recognize a separate cause
of action for oppression by minority shareholders and some found
the opinion surprising. 101 The idea that oppression could be a separate cause of action under Delaware common law was shortlived. In 1993, one year after the Litle opinion was announced, a
different chancery court judge stated: "I do not read Litle as establishing an independent cause of action for 'oppressive abuse of
discretion' distinct from a cause of action based on a breach of fi102
duciary
" This line of reasoning was similarly adopted by
the Delaware Supreme Court, which held in Nixon v. Blackwell
that there was no separate cause of action based on oppression. 103
In Nixon, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants attempted
to force a sale of the plaintiffs stock back to the corporation by
cutting dividends and breached "their fiduciary duties by authorizing excessive compensation for themselves and other employees," among other allegations. 104 The trial court ordered a buy-out
of the plaintiffs' stock. 100 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, finding that the trial court's judgment went
against the "well established ... jurisprudence that stockholders
need not always be treated equally for all purposes." 106 In so holding, the court found it significant that the plaintiffs were neither
employees of the corporation nor were they "protected by specific
provisions in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or a stockholders' agreement." 107 Further, the court went on to state that if

99. 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992).
100. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
101. Id.
102. Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. 12784 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *19 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 1993).
103. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379-80.
104. Id. at 1373.
105. Id. at 1373-74.
106. Id. at 1376.
107. Id. at 1377.
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equality in the treatment of stockholders were necessary in corporate decision-making,
was a matter for the Delaware legislature to decide, not the courts. 108 Accordingly, minority shareholders of closely held corporations incorporated in Delaware
cannot bring an independent claim of oppression.
In coming to the conclusion that Delaware law does not require
equal treatment of stockholders, the Nixon court sympathized
with the dilemma which minority shareholders face when attempting to receive the fair market value for their stock with no
market valuation. 109 The court, however, explained that any sympathy was "in the abstract" only, as any stock purchaser in reality
could bargain for more control and more rights before purchasing
the stock. 110 In so doing, the stock purchaser "make[s] a business
judgment whether to buy into such a minority position, and if so
on what terms." 111 The stock purchaser further has the ability to
protect himself on the front-end by entering into stockholder
agreements that "provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out
provisions, voting trusts, or other voting agreements." 112 Thus, the
Nixon court found that "[t]he tools of good corporate practice are
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with consideration." 113
Finally, the court held that "[i]t would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for
which the parties had not contracted." 114
In disallowing shareholder oppression actions, the Nixon court
clearly believed that Delaware law provides sufficient protection
for minority shareholders through the courts' commitment to enforcing fiduciary duties. 115 Delaware courts still "critically exam-

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1379.
110. Id. at 1379-80.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1380.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1379-81 ("It would run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent
legal significance ... for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority
investors .... "); see also Siegel, supra note 37, at 404 ("Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court in Nixon confirmed ... that there is no separate cause of action for oppression or for frustration of reasonable expectations."). By discouraging litigation, Delaware
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ine otherwise ordinary decisions that were, in reality, designed to
starve out the minority shareholder." 116 Thus, "while shareholders
in [Delaware] will not have their reasonable expectations or mere
preferences satisfied, it is a gross exaggeration to assume that
courts in these states would permit these shareholders to be
.
. f airness
.
a b use d ." 117 H owever, given
t h at D e1aware ' s entire
stan dard does not require equality, there is still the possibility that a
financial freeze-out may result, or alternatively, may be allowed
to persist due to a court's hesitancy to find oppression under the
doctrine of entire fairness. 118
Although front-end protection through contract is ideal, and
should be encouraged by the courts, simply expecting a minority
shareholder to protect himself upfront ignores the reality of who
most minority shareholders are and what information is available
to them prior to purchasing a minority interest in a corporation. 119
First, those involved in a closely held corporation are frequently
friends or family members. 120 These personal relationships help
create "an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the
sense that contractual protection is needed." 121 To correct this

Ii j

courts may also be trying to prevent the significant corporate turmoil that accompanies
litigation. As one commentator noted, "[t]raditional litigation of such shareholder disputes
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg." Susan Marmaduke, A Statutory Escape Route: Shareholder Disputes, 70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 36, 36 (2010).
In such circumstances, "[b]y the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the company may be damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and
costs are crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the
enterprise and its customers." Id.
116. Siegel, supra note 37, at 453.
117. Id. at 457.
118. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381. The entire fairness standard requires two things: fair
dealing and a fair pricing.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.
Id. at 1376 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)). Although
entire fairness is a more stringent standard than the deferential business judgment rule,
it does not require shareholders to be treated equally, as made clear by the Nixon court.
Id.
119. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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mentality, states could enact legislation that would require owners of limited liability companies and corporations to read warnings about the risks of starting a business or "purchasing an equity interest in an existing closely-held [corporation]" without
advanced planning. 122 Increasing the educational opportunities
available to owners would increase the likelihood of advance
planning,
subsequently provide for better protection of a mi123
nority shareholder's interests.

B. Interpreting the Oppression Provision as Expansive and

Allowing Alternative Remedies
Courts in other jurisdictions that have enacted the MBCA, including Washington and Missouri, have interpreted their statutes
to allow for remedies up to and including dissolution in minority
shareholder oppression cases. 124 The Supreme Court of Washington and the Missouri Court of Appeals have both held that the
125
MBCA does not limit a court's equitable power.
1. Washington
In Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., the Supreme Court of Washington held that the MBCA's oppression provision allows for equita126
ble remedies other than dissolution. The plaintiff in Scott filed
suit against the defendant alleging, among other things, oppres127
sion and misapplication or waste of corporate assets. The plain-

122. Molitor, supra note 2, at 496.
123. Id. at 581, 585. Again, however, one must consider the mentality of an unsophisticated shareholder starting a corporation (who might breeze through any reading material
provided him by the state) and those shareholders who inherited their interest in the corporation.
124. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.494 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.); WASH.
REV. CODE§ 23B.14.300 (2012); see, e.g., ALA. CODE§ lOA-2-14.30 (LexisNexis 2013); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10-11430 (2013); ARK CODE ANN.§ 4-33-1430 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-1430 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-lA-1430 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301
(2012).
125. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 4-5, 9 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material
Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
126. Scott, 64 P.3d at 9-10.
127. Id. at 4.
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tiff requested dissolution, which the trial court granted. 128 The
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding no
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 129 The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the order of dissolution, holding that the evidence presented in support of dissolution was not sufficient for
such a drastic remedy when other, less drastic remedies could
have been ordered by the trial court and were appropriate under
the circumstances. 130
Washington's oppression statute, just like Virginia's, states
that a trial court may dissolve a corporation if there is oppression.131 In determining that the statute allowed for remedies other
than oppression, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that
dissolution suits were "fundamentally equitable in nature." 132 Relying on this conclusion, the court reasoned that trial courts faced
with an oppression case could consider alternative equitable remedies.133 Those remedies included: (1) an entry
an order requiring dissolution at a future date if the shareholders
not come
to an agreement; (2) appointment of a receiver to run the affairs
of the corporation; and (3) "an award of damages to [the] minority
shareholders . . . for any injury suffered by them." 134 The Scott
court further found that "[d]issolution should not be granted as a
matter of right, since the provision allowing judicial dissolution is
'clearly couched in language of permission."' 135 Thus, while Washington's oppression statute "grants ... courts discretion to dissolve a corporation when those in control of the corporation are
acting oppressively," the courts should not exercise such discretion unless "a remedy as severe as involuntary dissolution" is

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
1973)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
WASH. REV. CODE§ 23B.14.300(2)(b) (2012).
Scott, 64 P.3d at 9.
Id. (citing Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)).
Id. (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Or.

135. Id. at 5 (quoting Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512,
516 (Wash. 1981)).
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136

necessary given the circumstances
particular case.
court opinions have taken the supreme
137
a variety remedies in oppression cases.
2. Missouri
The Missouri Court of Appeals has also held that dissolution is
138
not an exclusive remedy under the MBCA.
Fix v. Fix Material Co., the plaintiff sued under Missouri's Business Corporation
seeking dissolution of the closely held corporation in which
she was a minority shareholder due to oppressive conduct by
those
control. 139 The plaintiff presented evidence of long-term
employment contracts that the defendants awarded themselves
as well as salary increases given to the defendants during years
140
when the company suffered net losses. Although the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, it held that the defendants' actions were "narrowly close" to oppression, and that a
future suit
the plaintiff might be successful if the defendant's
course of
failed to change. 141 The Fix court
ruled
if a future suit was brought, the trial court had the power to
order a variety of equitable remedies, including payment of damages, declaration of a dividend, buy-out of a minority sharehold142
er's stocks,
if warranted, dissolution.
In an earlier decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that
a previous version of the oppression statute, which allowed for
liquidation of a corporation when the majority stockholders acted
oppressively, was permissive in nature, and the courts were "not
restricted to that remedy." 143 Thus, both the Supreme Court of

136. Id. at 10.
137. See, e.g., Skarbo v. Skarbo Scandinavian Furniture Imp., Nos. 54288-5-I, 54470-5I, 2005 WL 1950599, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (ordering a buy-out of the minority shareholder's shares); Snopac Prods. v. Spencer, No. 66115-9-I, 2012 WL 2688797,
at *6-9 (Wash. Ct. App. July 9, 2012) (affirming the buyout of the minority shareholder's
shares and payment of attorney fees as both were reasonable given the evidence).
138. Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 356-57.
139. Id. at 354.
140. Id. at 356, 359.
141. Id. at 361.
142. Id. at 357 n.3 (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387,
395-96 (Or. 1973)).
143. Kirtz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). This liquidation
statute has since been replaced by Missouri's adoption of the MBCA's oppression provi-

308

UNNERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:287

Washington and the Missouri
of Appeals have found that
the very language of the
for
equitable remedies on its face, w1tn no
to explicitly add additional remedies. 144 Other state courts have
ruled similarly and allowed equitable remedies despite dissolution being the only remedy expressly available under
statute.145
C. Adding a Non-Exhaustive List of Remedies to
Statute

Oppression

Other jurisdictions have modified the MBCA's oppression procourts
vision to include a list of equitable remedies that the
146
can consider as an alternative to dissolution. To further illustrate this point, three states will serve as
Jersey has added a list of remedies for use in
where the corporation has twenty-five or less
cond, Illinois has added a non-exhaustive
dies available
oppression cases. 148
a non-exhaustive list of equitable remedies
Illinois' statute. 149

sion.
144. Id.; Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9, 10 (Wash. 2003); Fix, 538 S.W.2d at
357.
145. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980) (finding
that Alaska's dissolution statute allowed equitable remedies). Although this case was decided under prior law, Alaska's current dissolution statute is quite similar. See ALASKA
STAT.§ 10.06.628 (2012); see also Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 235 (Mont. 1983) ("We
hold that [Montana's previous oppression statute] is permissive rather than mandatory,
and that district courts are empowered, but not required, to liquidate when corporate assets have been misapplied or wasted."). Montana's legislature has since adopted a new
statute that lists alternative remedies available to courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1939 (2013).
146. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1434 (West 2013) (providing a pre-trial buy-out
option that is very similar to Virginia's buy-out provision, Virginia Code section 13.1749.1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434(3) (2013) (adding alternative remedies to
Maine's oppression statute).
·
147. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:l2-7(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
148. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013).
149. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L.
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of remedies available to
shareholders of a close corporation in Oregon), with 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.56(a)-(b)
(2013) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of n~medies available to shareholdes in nonpublic corporations).

2014)

1. New Jers1

New Jerse
added a list
Jersey's stat
custodian, a1
poration's st'
tion ...."15 c
pointed by a
elected direc
and to vote
more power
cise all of th1
extent neces
best interest
to court-imp
that remediE
able in caseE
holders. 154

The Supr1
sey's oppresi
fact that tra,
cessful at cu
ly-held corpc
accordingly
tervene and
to even the 1
tioned that ;
not to provi1
against the
authorities c

150. N.J. STA'
151. Id. § 14A
152. See id. §
153. Id. (empl
154. Id. § 14A
155. Brenner
than Royce Int'l,
156. Id. at IO:
157. Id. at 10
Corporations, 13:

[Vol. 49:287

lave found
allows
the
1te courts have
lespite dissolumder the stat-

~e

Oppression

)ppression prothe trial courts
o
illusles. First, New
"""~·"''·' cases
147 Sereme~gon has
very similar to

. Fix, 538 S.W.2d at

laska 1980) (finding
:h this case was deimilar. See ALASKA
5 (Mont. 1983) ("We
ff than mandatory,
when corporate asnce adopted a new
CODE ANN. § 35-1-

a pre-trial buy-out
Code section 13.1native remedies to

is. Sess.).

;hrough Ch. 121 L.
iedies available to
ltat. 5/12.56(a)-(b)
iareholdes in non-

2014]

NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

309

1. New Jersey

New Jersey is one of the few states where the state legislature
added a list of alternative remedies to
MBCA. Under New
Jersey's statute, the trial court has the authority to "appoint a
custodian, appoint a provisional director, order a sale of the corporation's stock ... , or enter a judgment dissolving the corporation ...."150 Pursuant to the statute, a provisional director appointed by a court would have all the authority and power of an
elected director of the corporation, "including the right to notice of
and to vote at meetings." 151 Further, a custodian is given even
more power .... 152 A custodian appointed by the court may "exercise all of the powers of the corporation's board and officers to .the
extent necessary to manage the affairs of the corporation in the
best interests of its shareholders and creditors ... ," subject only
to court-imposed limitations. 153 New Jersey's statute makes clear
that remedies for minority shareholder oppression are only
able in cases where the corporation has twenty-five or less shareholders.154
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has interpreted New
sey's oppression provision as responding "at least in part, to
fact that traditional principles of corporate law were often unsuccessful at curbing abuses of power by majority interests
closely-held corporations." 155 The addition of alternative remedies was
accordingly meant to "increas[e] the willingness of courts to in156
tervene and provide relief to shareholders." Although expected
to even the balance of power, the Brenner v. Berkowitz court cautioned that the statute was "meant only to protect the minority,
not to provide a weapon to enable it to obtain unfair advantage
against the majority." 157 Finally, while a review of the relevant
authorities does not overtly shed light on why the New Jersey leg-

150. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:12-7(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
151. Id.§ 14A:12-7(3).
152. See id. § 14A:12-7(4).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. § 14A:12-7(l)(c).
155. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Int'l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)).
156. Id. at 1032.
157. Id. at 1030 (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1730 (1990)).
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islature limited the availability of alternative remedies in oppression cases to corporations with twenty-five or less shareholders, it
is plausible that this limitation is meant to recognize the fact that
the most vulnerable shareholders are usually those who start, or
enter into, corporations with family and friends that are generally small and have only a few shareholders.
2. Illinois

Illinois is another state where the legislature added additional
remedies other than dissolution in cases of minority shareholder
158
oppression. Under Illinois' Business Corporation Act, the trial
court can order a variety of remedies in oppression cases, including removal from office of an officer or director, payment of dividends, award of damages, and a buy-out. 159 Dissolution may also
be ordered, but only if the court determines that any alternative
remedy would be insufficient. 160 The statute goes on to state that
the listed remedies are not exclusive. 161 Accordingly, Illinois' legislature has cloaked Illinois courts with broad discretionary power
to order appropriate remedies in minority shareholder oppression
cases.
Illinois' General Assembly adopted its oppression statute, along
with the list of remedies, in response to the Illinois' courts aversion toward granting relief
cases where "shareholder relation162
ships broke down." This aversion led some "shareholders to resort to 'self-help' measures," such as establishing a competing
business, that were "injurious both to themselves and the corporation."163 Further, in interpreting the policy behind Illinois' oppression statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that the alternative remedies were "specifically enacted to ... increas[e] the
remedies available to minority shareholders and ... enlarg[e] the

158. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.f6(a)(3) (2013).
159. Id. §§ 5/12.56(b)(3), (b)(9)-(11).
160. Id. § 5/12.56(b)(12).
161. Id. § 5/12.56(c).
162. William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders
in Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 606 (1998).
163. Id. For example, in Hagshenas v. Gaylord, the plaintiff, following the court's refusal to intervene in a case involving deadlock, established a competing business and began poaching employees from the defendant's business. 557 N.E.2d 316, 318-20 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990).
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[g]iven the infinite number of ways that business partners can oppress each other, the Illinois statutory scheme is effective because it
is flexible enough to preserve the assets of the corporation, and because, at the same time, it provides the disputing parties with a
165
framework that allows them to work out their differences.

3. Oregon
Finally, Oregon's statute is very similar to Illinois' oppression
statute. 166 Oregon's oppression statute provides courts with a nonexhaustive list of equitable remedies that courts can order. These
remedies include alteration of the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, 167 the removal from office of any director or of169
ficer,168 the appointment of an individual as a director or officer,
170
or the award of damages to an aggrieved party. Oregon's statute
further instructs the court that dissolution is only appropriate
the court determines that no remedy specified in the
subsections] or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve

164. Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996). Although the court concentrated on the alternative remedy statute for public corporations, the court found that its
statutory construction "comports with the current statutory scheme regulating shareholder remedies for nonpublic corporations." Id. The court further noted that the addition of
these alternative remedies was a direct response to earlier Illinois court decisions holding
that a shareholder in a public corporation could not be granted an alternative remedy unless the defendant's conduct rose to a level that justified dissolution. Id. at 1175-76; see
also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (2012) (listing remedies available to a shareholder in a
public corporation who is alleging oppression by controlling shareholders).
165. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 615.
166. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L.
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (Oregon's statute regarding remedies available to shareholders
of a closely held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013) (Illinois'
statute regarding remedies available to shareholders of private coporations).
167. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.952(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.).
168. Id. § 60.952(2)(c).
169. Id. § 60.952(2)(d).
170. Id. § 60.952(2)G).
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171

the matters in dispute." Thus, much like Illinois, Oregon courts
are provided with significant discretion to order a variety of remedies in cases involving minority shareholder oppression.

III. VIRGINIA'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD EXPAND THE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR OPPRESSION

Virginia's General Assembly should follow Illinois and Oregon's
lead and add equitable remedies to the oppression statute. The
statute should track the language of Oregon's statute by providing a list of remedies, including alteration of the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, the removal from office of any
director or officer, the appointment of an individual as a director
or officer, the award of damages to an aggrieved party, or the declaration of dividends. The statute should also explicitly state that
the remedies are not exclusive and dissolution should be a last
resort option which is only ordered after the court has considered
other remedies and deemed them insufficient.
A. Proposed Statute for Virginia
This proposed legislation is taken from Oregon's oppression
statute. Although Oregon and Illinois' statute are similar in many
aspects, for the reasons discussed below, Oregon's statute better
addresses all the concerns raised by minority shareholder oppression. The proposed Virginia statute reads, in pertinent part: 172
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court
may order one or more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this
section if it is established that:

(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent;
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the followmg:

171.
172.

Id. § 60.952(2)(m).
This is an excerpted version of the statute. For the full version, see the Appendix.
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(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or
officers or any other party to the proceeding;
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the
conditions prescribed by the court;
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution;
(i) The issuance of distributions;
G) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more shareholders of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for
their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection
(5) of this section;
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsection or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the corporation, the court shall consider among other relevant evidence the financial condition of the corporation but may not refuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.
(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or eliminate any of the remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), G) and (m) [referring to
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section
may not be eliminated.
(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsection (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the reasonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they existed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and

313

314

UNNERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:287

with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to
173
the business of the corporation.

As previously mentioned, Oregon and
oppression statutes are,
many respects, mirror images of each other. 174 Oregon's statute, however, does have one significant difference that
Virginia should adopt. Under Oregon's statute, shareholders are
allowed to "eliminate any of the remedies" by agreement, except
for the award of damages, an accounting, or dissolution. 175 As dis176
cussed in more detail below, this section helps to relieve some of
the concerns raised by those skeptical of expanding the statutory
remedies available to trial courts in minority shareholder oppression cases. Virginia would do well to follow suit
adopt the
proposed statute containing a similar provision.

B. Benefits of Expanding the Statutory Remedies in Oppression
Cases
Courts in other states have found that the MBCA allows for
remedies besides dissolution, including buy-outs and the appointment of custodial receivers to monitor the corporation. 177
Courts in these states have allowed for other remedies because,
among other reasons: (i) additional options increases the likelihood that a judge will order an effective remedy, (ii) the courts
should offer some protection to minority shareholders who inherit
their shares or fail to protect themselves when they enter into a
closely
corporation, and (iii) less drastic remedies help prevent power imbalances that are too
favor of either the
shareholder or the minority shareholder.

173. As a note, Virginia's pre-trial buy-out statute would still be an option to the defendants or the corporation as a way to end litigation prior to a trial. VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-749.l (Cum. Supp. 2013).
174. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth the remedies available to shareholders of a closely
held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a) (2013) (setting forth the remedies
available to shareholders of a private coporation).
175. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.).
176. See infra Part III(B).
177. See supra Parts II(B), (C).
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1. Alternative Remedies Increase the Likelihood of an Effective
Remedy Being Ordered

First, additional remedies increase the likelihood that a judge
will order an effective remedy, thereby giving greater protection
to minority shareholders. 178 In a study that analyzed forty-seven
court decisions involving minority shareholder oppression between 1984 and 1985, buy-outs were the most common remedy
ordered, comprising 54% of the cases, with dissolution only being
ordered
ten of the cases (or 27%) and other relief besides disso179
lution or buy-outs being ordered in three other cases (8%).
Thus, a buy-out was the predominant remedy ordered
jurisdictions that allowed equitable remedies. Another study confirmed
this conclusion, finding that 54% of cases initiated between 1960
and 1976 ended
a buy-out, even in cases where the court denied the plaintiffs relief.1 8° Further, the 1985 study found that
buy-outs were most common in cases involving a family owned
business. 181 With buy-outs being so common, courts should be given the ability to order this remedy.
As discussed above, Virginia already has a pre-trial buy-out option.182 Thus, it would appear that Virginia has provided the most
common alternative remedy and no additional change is necessary. However, while pre-trial buy-outs are an option that defendants and corporations should have available to them, some
183
might decide instead to proceed to trial.
Under the current
statutory regime, once the defendant and corporation have decided to forego a pre-trial buy-out, the only other remedy available is
dissolution. 184 The pre-trial buy-out, therefore, does nothing to

Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 26.
Id. at 51, 53.
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, flliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 30, 33
(1977).
181. Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 56.
182. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); supra Part I(C).
183. For example, in Colgate u. Disthene Group, the Disthene Group and its shareholders chose not to accept a pre-trial settlement or elect to buy-out the plaintiffs. See generally supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Colgate case and pointing out
that the litigation ended in a large buy-out settlement but only after a trial on the merits,
and after the subsequent appeal had been granted).
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol.
2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). A plaintiff does not have the option to force a pre-trial buy-out
178.
179.
180.

option to the deVA. CODE ANN. §
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remedy the court's reluctance to order dissolution nor does it help
protect minority shareholders should the majority not want to
them out.
2. Courts Should Provide Some Protection to Minority
Shareholders Who Fail to Protect Themselves or Who Inherit
Their Shares
Second, the General Assembly should recognize the realities of
human psychology; that is, that people are inherently optimistic
185
about their own future. Although most minority shareholders
have the opportunity to protect themselves prior to purchasing
shares, with the exception being shareholders who are gifted or
inherit their stock, many fail to do so. 186 Even well-educated people might get caught up in the romanticism of starting a business
with their friends or family and, in so doing, decide that the costs
of protection (including hiring an attorney to draft employment or
buy-sell agreements) outweigh any potential risk-especially
when the probabilities of those risks are so far-fetched in the subjective minds of the would-be minority shareholders. 187 Further,
there is still the segment of minority shareholders who do not
have the opportunity to protect themselves because they either
inherited or were gifted their stock. 188 These individuals may have

by the defendant or the corporation. Id.§ 13.1-749.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
185. Molitor, supra note 2, at 554.
186. See id. at 495-96, 554.
187. Moll, supra note 30, at 912; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558
(N.C. 1983) (observing that "close corporations are often formed by friends or family members who simply may not believe that disagreements could ever arise"). Further, some individuals might not be comfortable raising the issue of potential future conflict and protective agreements, especially when their partners are friends or family. Although clearly not
the exact same situation, it is interesting to consider the unpopularity of prenuptial
agreements even when a person's financial security is at stake. See Beth Potier, For Many,
Prenups Seem to Predict Doom, HARV. U. GAZETTE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.news.har
vard.edu/gazette/2003/10.16/01-prenup.html. Although this might seem like an almost
laughable comparison in the world of business, it is important to remember the kinds of
people who are more likely to get caught in a cycle of oppression: individuals who do not
have business backgrounds and start a company with their friends or family. See Molitor,
supra note 2, at 491, 554. Thus, minority shareholders, if aware of the types of protection
available, may be uncomfortable raising these issues and instead decide to forego an uncomfortable conversation with the hope and beliefthat no issues will arise in the future.
188. Some may argue that, although the descendants had no opportunity to protect
themselves, the original shareholder who bequeathed the minority shares did have such
an opportunity and failed to secure any protection. Thus, Guy Dixon, who originally
bought the kyanite mine and founded the Disthene Group, had the opportunity to leave
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a large portion or even all of their inheritance tied up in a corporation, with no hope of liquidating any of the inheritance without
the approval of the majority shareholder. For example, the minority shareholders in Colgate inherited millions in non-voting stock
from their grandfather. 189 Although the minority shareholders
proposed a buy-out and offered the majority shareholder a settlement after the case was initiated, the majority shareholders refused.
3. Less Drastic Remedies Help Prevent Power Imbalances
Finally, in some circumstances, a court that finds a majority
shareholder's actions concerning, but not rising to the level where
dissolution would be appropriate, has no other remedies to offer
the plaintiff. 190 Because of this, majority shareholders might be
rewarded for bad behavior that is just shy of continual oppression. As some scholars have pointed out, courts are reluctant to
order the drastic remedy of dissolution unless there is clear evidence of continued oppression. 191 This reluctance to order dissolution undermines the very purpose of the oppression statute-that
192
is, to protect minority shareholders. Accordingly, alternative
remedies are necessary to provide courts with flexibility to respond to the various circumstances presented in a case.
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his son and daughter an equal share of the business, but chose to create a majority shareholder and minority shareholder. Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287
(2012) (Buckingham County). This argument ignores the fact that most individuals do not
foresee future problems arising from a minority shareholder situation, particularly in a
family situation where the inheriting parties are siblings or otherwise related.
189. McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85. The Disthene Group was worth an estimated $200 million; the plaintiffs owned 42% of the stock.
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287.
190. Hetherinton & Dooley, supra note 180, at 9-11 (An oppression action under the
MBCA "require[s] the minority to establish that the majority's conduct is sufficiently culpable to give rise to an action for damages at common law ... [even in cases involving]
disputable value judgments where courts are traditionally reluctant to interfere with
management decisions.").
191. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 30 at 893-94; see Drastic Times, supra note 7; see also
Scott v. Trans-System, 64 P.3d 1, 10 (Wash. 2003) (finding that the defendants' conduct
did not rise to the continuous level necessary to justify dissolution of the corporation).
192. Although plaintiffs may also bring fiduciary duty claims, the only additional remedy available to them is damages. While paying damages may bring about a change in the
corporate culture, a fiduciary duty claim does not allow a court to judicially sever ties between the minority shareholder and the corporation, a remedy that might be necessary
given the souring of relationships that led to the lawsuit in the first place.
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C. Counter-Arguments to Adding Equitable Remedies to
Virginia's Oppression Statute
Those critical of adding equitable remedies to the oppression
provision in Virginia's dissolution statute, or alternatively adopting an independent oppression statute, offer several counterarguments against doing so. Those counter-arguments include: (i)
there are very few cases that actually proceed to trial, (ii) minority shareholders should protect themselves, and (iii) allowing alternative remedies puts too much power in the hands of the judiciary to essentially oversee businesses.
1. Few Cases Actually Advance to Trial
Very few cases alleging minority shareholder oppression are
actually brought
Virginia, raising the question of whether additional remedies are necessary to handle so few cases. Indeed,
since 2005, when the Virginia General Assembly allowed pre-trial
buy-out options, only two cases alleging oppression have gone to
193
trial. Further, some may argue that a minority shareholder is
not bound to bring a dissolution cause of action as his only hope
for remedying a case of oppression; instead, minority shareholders may also bring fiduciary duty claims or other business tort
claims.

Colgate, one of only two cases brought following the enactment
the pre-trial buyout option in Virginia, the minority
shareholders also brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against the majority shareholders, 194 who were also directors. Under Virginia Code section 13.1-690, "[a] director shall discharge
his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a
committee,
accordance with his good faith business judgment
the best interests of the corporation." 195 They likely would have
won at the
court level on a fiduciary duty claim. The Colgate
court found that the business judgment rule did not protect the
majority shareholders since "Disthene's board of directors did not

193. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); Cattano v. Bragg, 283 Va. 638,
727 S.E.2d 625 (2013); Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 286.
194. Although fiduciary duty claims were brought, the parties agreed to litigate the
oppression claims first. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288-90.
195. VA. CODEAi'JN. § 13.l-690(A) (Rep!. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
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act as a board and make informed decisions." 196 Further, the trial
court went on to find that the board "merely bent to [the majority
shareholder's] ironhanded will and rubberstamped his decisions,"
and that "[the majority shareholder and his son] were motivated
not by the best interests of the corporation, but by their personal
best interests." 197
A fiduciary duty claim, however, would not have ended the
family dispute. Although a successful fiduciary duty claim would
have provided the plaintiffs with a steady stream of income, it
might not have stopped continued oppression by the majority
shareholders. While this theory is necessarily speculative, the
majority shareholders' past actions show a pattern of continued
oppression unheeded by judicial action. Several years before the
oppression lawsuit, the Colgate plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging
the looting of the plaintiffs stock, which the majority shareholder
moved out of the family trust and placed into one of the corporation's many holdings. 198 Following a ruling for the plaintiffs and a
severe rebuking from the bench, the defendant majority shareholders agreed to settle the case. 199 Despite the consequences of
the trust litigation, the majority shareholders soon cut the plaintiffs dividends while increasing their own pay and bonuses. 200 The
majority shareholders' continued oppressive conduct eventually
led to the dissolution lawsuit. 201 Thus, as the Colgate case shows,
equitable remedies are necessary to adequately respond to the
cases that appear before Virginia courts.
2. Minority Shareholders Can Protect Themselves with Contracts
Another argument offered is that, in most cases, minority
shareholders can protect themselves by entering into employment
agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to investing in a corporation. Unfortunately, human nature leads inexperienced investors to be overly optimistic of the business's

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294.
Id.
Id. at 288; see McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70.
McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70; see Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288.
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 289.
Id.
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likely success and too trusting of their business partners. 202 For
example, in the hypothetical discussed in Part I, 203 C invested in a
corporation with two of his friends. C believed that, as an equal
owner, his status as an employee of the corporation was protected
and did not protect himself with a buy-sell agreement or an employment contract. Unfortunately for C, his employee status was
not protected and business conflicts led A and B to agree to fire C
and cut dividend payments.
In order to prevent future investors from making the same mistakes as C, some scholars argue that business owners should be
required to learn about ways to protect themselves prior to entering into a business agreement. 204 Prospective owners of a corporation could be required to read a document that outlines potential
risks and ways to protect against those risks prior to being able to
register a corporation. 205 These documents would be maintained
206
by the state and made available on the state's website.
This approach, however, would not work for individuals who
inherited a corporation, like the plaintiffs in Colgate. It was, in
fact, the original owner of the corporation (the plaintiffs' grandfather and defendant's father) who left them with a minority/majority shareholder situation, instead of giving each line of
descendants an equal share in the corporation. 207 Yet, requiring
some education prior to the registration of a closely held corporation would probably reduce the likelihood of oppression and would
lessen the need for alternatives to dissolution.
Further, the proposed statute would allow savvy shareholders
to protect themselves with contracts on the front end while also
protecting those shareholders that did not foresee potential problems or who were unable to protect themselves. 208 The proposed
legislation allows shareholders to agree to eliminate all the alternative remedies listed, excepting the award of damages, an ac-

202.
text.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Thompson, supra note 1, at 705; see also supra notes 185-87 and accompanying

See supra Part I(A).
See Molitor, supra note 2, at 496.
See id.
See id. at 575.
Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 288 (2012) (Buckingham County).
See supra Part III(A).
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counting, or dissolution. 209 Thus, shareholders who do not want
these alternative remedies to be available in any future disputes
can contract
away. This does not hinder the statute's main
goal-protection of minority shareholders-because those shareholders are agreeing to terms up front instead of informally forming a corporation with very little protection.
Finally, the proposed statute helps prevent an imbalance of
power in favor of the minority shareholder, who could threaten
havoc with an oppression suit. With alternative remedies available, courts that were once hesitant to provide any remedy because
the only remedy was dissolution may now be more willing to order lesser remedies. The increased likelihood of some sort of remedy being awarded to
plaintiff increases the power of the mi210
nority shareholder. Allowing for an opt-out of almost all the
remedies restores that balance of power while also ensuring that
the minority shareholder understands the vulnerability of his position prior to exchanging consideration for stock.
3. Allowing Alternative Remedies Places Too Much Power in the
Hands of the Judiciary
A final argument against expanding equitable remedies in minority shareholder oppression cases is that doing so increases the
judiciary's power and allows a judge to essentially oversee businesses. It is certainly true that cases that might have previously
been dismissed because the judge was reluctant to order dissolution may now instead see a ruling
favor of the plaintiff with an
equitable remedy ordered. However, the business judgment rule
still applies in cases of oppression and still creates a presumption
that a director has acted "in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation." 211 It is not
209. See supra Part III(A).
210. As one scholar pointed out, '"[t]raditional litigation of such shareholder disputes
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg."' In such circumstances, "[b]y the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the company may be
damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and costs are
crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the enterprise
and its customers." Marmaduke, supra note 115. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the
corporation and the majority shareholders to avoid litigation when possible, giving the
conniving minority shareholder the power to hold the corporation hostage to potential litigation.
211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).

322

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:287

until after the plaintiff has rebutted this presumption and proven
oppression that a judge can grant equitable remedies. 212 Equitable
remedies thus protect minority shareholders while not overstepping or overruling the business judgment rule.
CONCLUSION

Currently, minority shareholders who allege oppression in Virginia may only request dissolution as a remedy. 213 While many
states, either through legislation or case law, have found that
214
courts have the power to order remedies other than dissolution,
215
the Supreme Court of Virginia has
otherwise. Thus,
supreme court has placed the ball squarely in the General Assembly's court-if additional remedies are to be provided, it must
be the General Assembly who acts to change the statute and explicitly allow such remedies. Legislatures in other states, such as
Oregon, have done just that by adding a non-exhaustive list of alternative remedies to their dissolution statutes
cases of minority shareholder oppression. 216 The General Assembly should follow
Oregon's lead by adopting the proposed oppression statute or, at
the very least, adding equitable remedies to the dissolution statute, thereby granting Virginia's trial courts the discretionary
power to order an appropriate remedy based on the unique facts
of a case.

212. As one of the plaintiff's attorneys in Colgate noted, "[u]ntil now, majority shareholders at many companies in Virginia and elsewhere have been able to run a company for
their own benefit while running roughshod over minority shareholders." Disthene Group
Settlement Bolsters Minority Shareholders' Rights, LECLAIRRYAN (Aug. 22, 2013), http:
//www.leclairryan.com/news/xprNewsDetail.aspx?xpST=NewsDetail&news=1007.
213. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1250(b) (2013); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 3 (Wash.
2003).
215. White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972).
216. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 60.952(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
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APPENDIX-PROPOSED DRAFT STATUTE

The full proposed statute would read:
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court
may order one or more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this
section if it is established that:
(a) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock and irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or
being suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation
can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally, because of the deadlock;
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent;
(c) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have
failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms
have expired; or
(d) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the following:
(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or
officers or any other party to the proceeding;
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the
conditions prescribed by the court;
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution;
(i) The issuance of distributions;
G) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more shareholders of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for
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their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection
(5) of this section;
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsection or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the corporation, the court shall consider among other relevant evidence the financial condition of the corporation but may not refuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.

pm
pur

(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or eliminate any of the remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), G) and (m) [referring to
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section
may not be eliminated.

(6) In an
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(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsection (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the reasonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they existed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and
with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to
the business of the corporation.
(5)(a) If the court orders a share purchase, the court shall:
(i) Determine the fair value of the shares, with or without the
assistance of appraisers, taking into account any impact on the
value of the shares resulting from the actions giving rise to a
proceeding under subsection (1) of this section;
(ii) Consider any financial or legal constraints on the ability of
the corporation or the purchasing shareholder to purchase the
shares;
(iii) Specify the terms of the purchase, including, if appropriate, terms for installment payments, interest at the rate and
from the date determined by the court to be equitable, subordination of the purchase obligation to the rights of the corporation's other creditors, security for a deferred purchase price
and a covenant not to compete or other restriction on the seller;
(iv) Require the seller to deliver all of the seller's shares to the
purchaser upon receipt of the purchase price or the first installment of the purchase price; and
(v) Retain jurisdiction to enforce the purchase order by, among
other remedies, ordering the corporation to be dissolved if the
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purchase is not completed in accordance with the terms of the
purchase order.
(A) The share purchase ordered under this subsection
shall be consummated within 20 days after the date the
order becomes final unless before that time the corporation files with the court a notice of its intention to dissolve and articles of dissolution are properly filed with
the Secretary of State within 50 days after filing the notice with the court.
(B) After the purchase order is entered and before the
purchase price is fully paid, any party may petition the
court to modify the terms of the purchase, and the court
may do so if the court finds that the modifications are
equitable.
(C) Unless the purchase order is modified by the court,
the selling shareholder shall have no further rights as a
shareholder from the date the seller delivers all of the
shareholder's shares to the purchaser or such other date
specified by the court.
(6) In any proceeding under subsection (1) of this section, the court

shall allow reasonable compensation to the custodian, provisional director, appraiser or other such person appointed by the court for services rendered and reimbursement or direct payment of reasonable
costs and expenses. Amounts described in this subsection shall be
paid by the corporation.
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